Affichage des articles dont le libellé est Consolidation. Afficher tous les articles
Affichage des articles dont le libellé est Consolidation. Afficher tous les articles

vendredi 7 juin 2013

Europe must invest more in Security

Quand le patron d'EADS appellent de ses voeux  et argumentent pour une consolidation de la défense européenne.

Tribune publiée dans le journal allemand Handelsblatt et sur le site de l'EDA.

Europe must invest more in security, demand Wolfgang Ischinger and Thomas Enders.

 In the years since the start of the financial and debt crisis, we in Europe have spent a lot of time intensely debating whether and how to integrate our financial and monetary area. As convinced Europeans, we support these efforts. However, the omnipresent financial crisis must not blind us to a second area of policy that is of equal importance for Europe and its citizens: security and defence.
In times of fiscal consolidation, European security and defence policy, too, finds itself at a historical turning point. Growing demands – such as the recent crises in Mali and Libya – are confronted by constant reductions in defence spending. Also in the area of security and defence, Europe must give up its national-mindedness and turn towards a policy of pooling and sharing. This concerns not only joint procurement, but also integration and the joint delivery and deployment of capabilities. We must maintain capabilities, share sovereignty and maintain and restructure our defence market.
That’s why the Munich Security Conference is today sending out invitations to the first “Future of European Defence Summit” in Berlin, where some 100 representatives from politics, defence and industry will informally discuss the future of European defence. To put this in perspective, at the European Council in December 2013, the heads of state and government will make a decision on the future viability of our joint contribution to security and our defence industry.

It is clear that Europe will increasingly itself be responsible for security in its own backyard. While it is certainly the case that the missions in Libya and Mali have demonstrated that Europe is capable of delivering significantly more than it often feels itself capable of, we in Europe are still a long way away from an independent spectrum of military capabilities for such assignments. In many areas, we continue to be reliant on our US partners, for in-flight refuelling on both missions, to name a specific example.
The problems are quickly identified: to close the known capability gap, we would have to invest billions in capabilities as well as research and development. In actual fact, however, European defence budgets have shrunk by around 12% on average since 2009. And further cuts cannot be ruled out. Today, whereas European taxpayers spend € 390 per inhabitant on security and defence, their US counterparts spend around € 1,680, over four times as much. In the medium term, however, our American friends will be unable and unwilling to come to our aid in every situation.
Europe is capable of fulfilling its responsibility, but, to do so, it must work together at the political level and press ahead with the integration and consolidation of supply and demand. As our budgets shrink, we still maintain a remarkable degree of military and industrial fragmentation in comparison with the USA. The defence business, however, continues to require high levels of research and capital investment.
Consequently, the only way in which Europe can expand its capabilities in the face of reduced spending on defence is to adopt a policy of pooling and sharing on the demand side and to consolidate its markets. In absolute terms, Europe spends less than half as much on defence as the USA. And that spending is spread over the armed forces of more than 20 nations with a scarcely integrated, often subcritical industry.

At present, only around one quarter of spending is on joint European programmes, while the remainder continues to take place at national level. On the other hand, we maintain six times as many weapon systems as the Americans. Also, as highlighted by a recent McKinsey analysis, in 40% of systems categories we have over twice as many competitors as in the USA (with its 2.5-fold spending on defence). In short, in many areas we are too small to allow ourselves the luxury of further fragmentation and low production volumes. It is obvious that such a structure costs a lot while delivering little benefit.

That much has also been conceded in many MoUs as well as in key political documents. In actual fact, however, we are still fragmented not just at the industrial level, but also on the political front. Three years after the resolutions on greater European pooling and sharing and a common defence market, and two years after the launch of the concept of “Smart Defence” by NATO Secretary General Rasmussen at the Security Conference, there is no concept for European strategic defence integration – just five months before the European Council begins its first deliberations on the issue.

There is a high price to pay for this missed opportunity, because our capacity to act at one defence-policy level will suffer as a consequence of this failure. As far as the big European countries are concerned, it will mean a loss of capability depth, while, for the small countries, it will – even more importantly – impact on the breadth of their sovereign capabilities. For example, the Dutch decision to give up its tank battalions demonstrates the extent to which the budget situation is already having an effect on our defence-policy decision-making.

The price of inaction is high also for Europe’s defence industry. What happens when nothing happens, is made clear by a glance at the major European combat jet programmes: production of all three concurrently running programmes is set to come to an end between 2018 and 2022, which means the very near future for an industry based on such long cycles. Without the prospect of new “structure-giving” programmes and plans to maintain our defence capabilities, we will lose technological skills and trained engineers to other industries. Those capabilities will thereafter be irretrievably lost to Europe.


Against this backdrop, Europe – especially Germany, France and the United Kingdom – should agree on three aspects of joint defence:

1. The strategic goal: What strategic set of capabilities does Europe wish to jointly maintain through pooling and sharing as well as through new programmes? The defence industry with its complex value-added chain requires a clear strategic perspective if it is to support these goals.

2. The degree of shared sovereignty: Even without a European army, “sharing our capabilities” means giving up sovereignty in return for a capacity to act. However, this does not apply absolutely: shared capabilities can be flexibly excluded from certain missions, as demonstrated by successful examples of integration such as the European Air Transport Command with its “red card” arrangements.

3. The market design: How much private sector do we want for the defence industry? If we intend to create efficient structures on the supply side, then consolidation and privatisation will be unavoidable. Competitive prices and greater economies of scale are essential if our excellent technology is to survive the growing global competition for emerging markets. The European Defence Agency (EDA) should create the relevant institutional framework by means of separate budgets and a mandate for the management of Research & Development programmes. The blueprint for this is provided by the example of the European Space Agency in the civil sector – all that is missing is the political will. A merger between EDA and OCCAR (Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation) could also represent a useful step towards increased cooperation.
No doubt about it, pressing ahead with such decisions now and committing to new dependencies will require courage and mutual trust. But what is Europe if not this: the realisation that a common market and political communitarization give rise to a greater capacity to act. Now is the time to implement these principles also at the level of security and defence.

Thomas Enders is CEO of the aerospace company EADS.
Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger is Chairman of the Munich Security Conference.

vendredi 3 août 2012

Vers une consolidation du secteur terrestre où pas?

La consolidation du secteur terrestre en Europe est un vieux serpent de mer depuis la fin de la guerre froide. La disparition du bloc soviétique et de la menace de hordes de T-72 déferlant dans la trouée de Fulda a durement touché l'industrie de défense terrestre européenne à la fin des années 1990 sans pour autant la faire disparaitre. 


 Sphinx de Panhard - photo de l'auteur - 2010

Tous les principaux acteurs de l'époque subsistent toujours, même s'ils portent parfois une nouveau nom. (cf Giat devenu Nexter). Néanmoins, malgré une certaine embellie au cours des dernières années sur le marché, principalement du fait du renouvellement des plateformes de combat d'infanterie, l'offre semble encore aujourd'hui surdimensionnée par rapport à la demande.

En effet là où ne subsiste plus que 3 plateformes majeures dans l'Aéronautique (l'Eurofighter de BAE/EADS, le Rafale de Dassault et le Gripen de Saab), on compte aujourd'hui  au moins 1 programme de véhicule de combat blindé et de char de combat par pays avec autant d'industriels à chaque fois:
  • 2 en Allemagne (Krauss Maffei Wegmann et Rheinmetall)
  • 1 en Italie (Iveco)
  • 1 en Espagne (General Dynamics Santa Barbara, filiale de GD US)
  • 1 au Royaume-Uni (BAE Systems)
  • Et cela sans parler des offres d'entreprises américaines. Au total donc plus d'une dizaine d'acteurs sur ce marché et cela rien qu'en Europe.
En France, on comptait même jusqu'à récemment 3 acteurs: Nexter, Panhard et Renault Truck Defense. Ces deux derniers, en discussion depuis plusieurs mois ont finalement trouvé un accord de rachat. Panhard ira donc rejoindre RTD à la fin de l'année pour constituer le n°2 du blindé terrestre en France.

Les raisons qui ont poussé à cette réorganisation sont multiples. Pour ma part j'en avancerais 3 principales:

1) la baisse continue des revenues des deux sociétés concernés et leur manque de taille critique. Sans pour autant mettre la future société à l’abri car encore très loin des  principaux concurrents à commencer par Nexter , l'alliance Panhard/RTD donnera naissance à une société générant environ 400m€ de CA par an mais surtout cette société sera accolée à Renault Truck elle même dans le giron de Volvo. 

2) Le lancement probable dans les prochains mois de 2 programmes de renouvellement pour l'armée de terre française, le VBMR (remplaçant du vénérable VAB) et l'EBRC (remplaçant de des AMX-10 et des Sagaies. Avec 3 industriels, l’État ne sera pas en mesure de fournir tous le monde en contrats de maitrise d’œuvre sachant déjà que ce dernier a des exigences de prix assez fortes (pas plus d'un million d'Euro selon le précédent CEMAT - cf le blog Secret Défense )
3) Les tressaillements du secteur de l'autre côté du Rhin pour KMW et Rheinmetall boosté récemment par la vente de 600 chars de combat à l'Arabie Saoudite et à la potentielle commande de 200 autres pour le Qatar.
 
 Cette fusion pourrait marquer le départ de la consolidation tant attendue du secteur terrestre en France mais aussi en Europe car autre point intéressant, il convient de rappeler la volonté de François Hollande de relancer la coopération industrielle avec l'Allemagne. Or celle-ci pourrait passer par le secteur terrestre. Selon un communiqué de Reuter publié en juin dernier, au moment d'Eurosatory, Paris et Berlin veulent en effet coordonner leurs nouveaux achats de chars et d'artillerie. Et à la même époque, le PDG de Nexter laissait sous-entendre de son côté que son groupe est à la recherche d'alliance en Europe.


Une brique vient d'être posée à l'édifice reste à savoir non pas tant si, mais quand et comment les autres viendront s'emboiter

vendredi 25 mai 2012

Signalement d'article: L'alternance réveille les ambitions inavouées des industriels de la défense

Je vous signale la sortie ce soir d'un bon article de la Tribune concernant les enjeux de l'industrie de défense française pour les prochaines années. Michel Cabirol revient en effet sur les grands chantiers potentiels/en attente entre acterus de premiers rang (EADS/Thales/Safran/Dassault) et de second rang (MBDA/Nexter/DCNS).

Le salon Eurosatory qui ouvre ses portes dans 3 semaines (du 11 au 15 juin) sera certainement l'occasion d'en savoir un peu plus sur tous ces sujets.

L'article est disponible en cliquant ici.

Bonne lecture.

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